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Abstract—Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have recently
attracted a lot of attention in the research community because it is
easy to deploy them in the physical environment and collect and
disseminate environmental data from them. The collected data
from sensor nodes can vary based on what kind of application
is used for WSNs. Data confidentiality and access control to that
collected data are the most challenging issues in WSNs because
the users are able to access data from the different location via
ad-hoc manner. Access control is one of the critical requirements
to prevent unauthorised access from users. The current access
control models in information systems cannot be applied straight-
forwardly because of some limitations namely limited energy,
resource and memory, and low computation capability. Based
on the requirements of WSNs, we proposed the Break-The-
Glass Access Control (BTG-AC) model which is the modified
and redesigned version of Break-The-Glass Role-Based Access
Control (BTG-RBAC) model. The several changes within the
access control engine are made in BTG-RBAC to apply and fit
in WSNs. We developed the BTG-AC model in Ponder2 package.
Also a medical scenario was developed to evaluate the BTG-AC
model for medical data in WSNs. In this paper, detail design,
implementation phase, evaluation result and policies evaluation
for the BTG-AC model are presented. Based on the evaluation
result, the BTG-AC model can be used in WSNs after several
modifications have been made under Ponder2 Package.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have been an area of
significant research for a decade because of the potential
to change the way of living with applications in military
surveillance, electronic medical record, medicine, disaster and
emergency management, and many other areas. Recently,
WSNs have become more widespread and more active in the
research community. The nature of WSNs consist of a hundred
or even a thousand of sensor nodes that have an ability to
collect, store and transfer data between each other in the
network. These days, the sensor nodes can even store and
collect multimedia information themselves. A user, who has
an appropriate permission, is able to access the collect data at
the sensor nodes directly via ad-hoc manner. This means that
the data security and control access to that data are essential to
provide in WSNs when the users try to access collected data
at the sensor nodes. Based on the requirements of application,
the provision of security requirements can change. For the
military and medical application, the data collected by sensor
nodes need to be stored securely and allowed access only to the
authorised users. Therefore, some kinds of security mechanism
are required for WSNs to provide the security requirements
such as confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, etc.
This paper focuses on an access control model in WSNs
and Body Area Networks (BANs). The current access control
models in information systems are not efficient enough to
apply directly in WSNs and BSNs because of limitations such
as limited memory, resource and power. These limitations
impose unique security challenge. A new light-weight access
control model is desired to provide the flexible making process
of decision in WSNs. Towards addressing these requirements
of WSNs, we developed a BTG-AC model. This is a modified
and redesigned version of BTG-RBAC [1] to better fit for
WSNs. It provides a flexible approach to the access control
engine. The implementation results in Ponder2 framework [2]
are also discussed. The remaining structure of this paper is
explained as follows. Section 2 presents the related work.
Section 3 discusses an overview of the BTG-AC model for
WSNs. The development and implementation of the BTG-AC
model can be seen in Section 4. Section 5 provides evaluation
results based on a medial scenario. Section 6 concludes the
paper with the suggestion for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
An access control is a critical security service to prevent
unauthorised access to certain network resources. In WSNs,
users can enter a sensor field directly to access data at
the sensor nodes. Different users may have different access
privileges to access data at the sensor nodes based on their
roles. Maw et al. [3] stated that a considerable number of
access control models has been proposed for use in WSNs,
though some of them are not yet implemented. Most of the
current access control models in WSNs and Wireless Medical
Sensor Network (WMSN) are based on traditional Role-Based
Access Control (RBAC), which has been widely accepted
as a policy access control model. Cryptography-based access
control is designed for the untrusted environment, where the
lack of global knowledge and control are defining charac-
teristics. Cryptography is relied upon to control data access
and to ensure data confidentiality and integrity. Cryptography
methods in WSNs should meet the constraints of sensor nodes.
Yu et al. [4] proposed the Fine-grained Distributed Data
Access Control (FDAC) model based on Attribute Based
Encryption. The main idea of their approach is to provide a
distributed data access control which is able to support fine-
grained access control over sensor data. A network controller,
which stores access structures, acts like a central distribution
centre and distributes keys to users in FDAC. Only users with
the right access structure and the right key can access data at
the sensor nodes. The access structures will be different for
each user depending on the access privileges of users. If the
network controller is compromised by a malicious user, there
will be no security provisioning in the system anymore.
Garcia-Morchon and Wehrle [5] proposed the Context-
Aware Role-Based Access Control (CA-RBAC) model based
on a modular context structure for WMSNs. The aim of the
model is to provide context awareness and adapt its security
properties to ensure the users’ safety. Normally, an authorised
doctor needs to verify his access control role in order to access
the medical data of a patient but a nurse may not have the same
level of privilege. When the system declares to be a critical or
emergency case based on the modular context information, the
doctor or nurse can take any action and can access data even
though they may not be able to access that data in normal
conditions. One of the disadvantages of this model is that
there is no prevention or detection mechanism nor verification
process to check a user’s data access right, when the emergency
occurs.
Maw et al. [6], [7] proposed an Adaptive Access Control
(A2C) model with privilege overriding and behaviour moni-
toring to provide fine-grained access control for medical data
in WSNs. This model has a similar structure to BTG-RBAC
[1] but the main difference is that no human effort is needed
to override rules and policies because of an introduction of the
users’ behaviour trust model, and the prevention and detection
mechanism. In this model, the users may be able to override
a denial of access, when unexpected events occur. In addition,
the users’ behaviour trust model is used to check the user’s
action, location, time, etc but there is no detailed information
about the behaviour trust model. Without the behaviour trust
model, the access decisions cannot be made effectively.
The current access control models in WSNs such as FDAC,
CA-RBAC and A2C are mostly looking at how to avoid overly
tight policy in the system. Sometimes, the overly tight access
control policy might hold access for the appropriate users in
unanticipated events. Ferreira et al introduced the BTG-RBAC
engine [1], [8] to integrate BTG in the core RBAC model with
obligations. They proposed to securely break access control in
a controlled manner. The BTG-RBAC model was developed in
Premis policy language with an Apache database and XML for
Electronic Medical Records (EMRs). The BTG-RBAC model
cannot be applied directly to WSNs because of limitations of
WSNs. This means that the proposed access control model
needs to be light-weight to apply in WSNs. Therefore, we
redesigned and modified the BTG-RBAC model to become a
light-weight access control model to fill the gaps of WSNs.
The proposed BTG-AC model has been developed in
Ponder2 [2] that is a popular light-weight policy language
for BANs and WSNs. Ponder2 is implemented as a Self
Managed Cell (SMC) [9]. It is a set of hardware and software
components forming an administrative domain. It is capable
of self management. We assumed that SMC is performed and
worked as the sensor node to evaluate the proposed BTG-AC
with the example medical scenario. Ponder2 comprises a self-
contained, stand-alone, general-purpose object management
system with message passing between objects. It incorporates
an awareness of events and policies and implements a policy
execution framework. It has a high-level configuration and con-
trol language called PonderTalk and user-extensible managed
objects are programmed in Java.
III. BREAK-THE-GLASS ACCESS CONTROL MODEL
Based on the requirements of WSNs, we modified and
redesigned the framework of the BTG-RBAC model to fit in
WSNs. Our model refer to as Break-The-Glass Access Control
(BTG-AC) still has similar functions to those of the BTG-
RBAC model. The main difference is that the BTG-AC model
has been developed and implemented within the Ponder2
policy package for BANs and WSNs. The proposed BTG-AC
model is to provide BTG action in access control engine for
decision making process regarding access. It provides more
flexible control of access to data in the event of emergency.
The BTG action will perform within the users’ traceability
by extending the access control engine with obligations for
auditing purposes.
Notwithstanding, an overview of BTG-AC in Ponder2
frame-work [2] can be seen in Figure 1. This shows that
there are two main modules in the BTG-AC model: Policy
Enforcement Point (PEP) and Policy Decision Point (PDP).
The user requests will go through PEP and all the user
formation will be forwarded to PDP for the decision making
processes. There are limitations and issues for the BTG-AC
model in Ponder2 language to fit in WSNs. These are discussed
as follow:
• There is no BTG state variable in BTG-AC. This
means that a fixed BTG state value is used.
• Initially the BTG state is set to FALSE but the state is
set as TRUE if there is policy rule that allows a user
to perform the BTG operation. The administrator can
change the BTG state variable and create a new BTG
state for the another or the same role.
• We have assumed that the authentication process is
already provided for PEP in the BTG-AC model
Fig. 1. Overview of the BTG-AC Model
The details information of PEP and PDP are explained next.
A. Policy Enforcement Point (PEP)
In BTG-AC, PEP performs as an authentication service
provider between the users and sensor nodes. The authenti-
cation service is needed for the provision of security in the
system especially when the access control model is allowing
users to perform BTG action for data access in emergency
situations. A user has to submit the information to PEP for the
authentication process. When PEP receives the access request
from the users, it will check the users’ information such as
their identity and cryptographic key. We assumed that the au-
thentication service is provided through use of a users’ normal
log-in process before forwarding request to PDP. In future, we
will work on the implementation of the authentication service
in PEP by using Attribute-Based-Encryption (ABE) [10].
B. Policy Decision Point (PDP)
In BTG-AC, PDP is a main module. When PDP receives
the decision request from PEP, the access control module will
make an access decision. There are different predefined roles
and policies in the access control module based on the users
location and users’ privileges. In the BTG-AC model, there
is another module - a prevention and detection module - that
keeps a record of all users’ information for audit purposes. The
two modules cooperate with each other to make the access
decision with some flexibility but still within the required
degree of prevention and detection. More details of the access
control module, and prevention and detection module are
explained next.
1) Access Control Module: The access control module is
used to enforce the policies for the decision making process.
The roles and policies are needed to predefine in advance.
Whenever the decision request is forwarded by PEP, the access
control module will check whether the information from that
decision request is matched with predefined roles and policy.
In the access control module, there are three different policies,
namely authorisation, BTG and obligation policy. These three
policies are developed and designed under the access control
module that can be seen on Figure 2.
Fig. 2. The Access Control Module
If a user’s criteria satisfies the access control policies, the
access request will be granted. If they do not match, the access
will be denied. In the BTG-AC model, BTG and the obligation
policies are introduced to make access decisions in normal
as well as emergency situations. A user can perform a BTG
action for the targeted object - say, confidential medical record
- in an emergency but some obligations will be triggered
and performed at the same time. In normal access control
models, the decision outcomes will be either permitted or
denied access. The existing decision outcomes in the normal
access control models are extended by introducing BTG and
obligation policy in the access control engine. These decision
outcomes are presented as follow:
• (Permit, ∅) → A user has permission to access the
targeted object.
• (Permit, OBLGS) → A user is allowed to access the
targeted object but an obligation is carried out when
the access is given.
• (Deny, ∅) → A user request to access the targeted
object is denied.
• (Deny, OBLGS) → Along side of a denied access,
some obligations are performed.
• (Permit(BTG)∗(OBLGS)) → A user’s request for ac-
cess has been granted by performing BTG action and
obligations such as ”Write to Audit”, ” Trigger the
Alarm” or ”A Notification Message” are performed
along with access decision.
Based on the above decision outcomes, it is clear that the
introduction of BTG and obligation policy is beneficial for
medical data in WSNs. The following section explains more
details of the authorisation, BTG and obligation policy in that
order.
• Authorisation Policy: An authorisation policy is used
in BTG-AC to enforce an access decision. It also
checks whether a user should be allowed to access
the targeted object. In authorisation policy, the subject,
target and action are checked to enforce the policy.
This means that a user, who wants to perform some
action on the target object that stores both normal
and confidential medical information, has to possess a
right access privilege. The access control module will
check whether a user’s access request has possessed
appropriate access right that the subject is allowed to
do at the targeted object.
• Break-the-Glass (BTG) Policy: A BTG policy is
used to perform a BTG operation on a targeted ob-
ject. To perform the BTG operation, the new role
that describes who is allowed to perform a certain
action at the targeted object, is added. The obligation
policy is used along with the BTG operation allowing
an administrator to take actions when the ”glass is
broken”. The new role can be added into the access
control module to present how the BTG state variable
is reset to FALSE. The BTG state of the permission
can be set from TRUE to FALSE or from FALSE to
TRUE. The administrator defines the BTG policy for
each situation where the BTG action is required by
users in an emergency situation.
• Obligation Policy: An obligation policy is used along
with authorisation and BTG policy in some situations.
The obligation policy checks whether one or more
conditions have been evaluated and if they have, they
carried out one or more actions to be performed. In
the BTG-AC model, after the authorisation policy has
made the evaluation, some obligations are performed
along with the decisions. Similarly the same hap-
pened when the BTG policy is activated and made
its decision. The obligation policy is linked with the
prevention and detection module to store the user
information and his access request as an audit log.
2) Prevention and Detection Module: A prevention and
detection module can be used for detecting security violations
and flaws in the defined application. It is used to prevent an
unauthorised access in the system. Whenever the obligation
policy is activated, actions such as write to audit, trigger the
alarm, send a notification message to administrator or auditor,
etc are performed. There are various methods to store the users’
information for the audit log but an event-oriented approach is
used to keep a record of the event when it happened, and user
information related to that event. Thus, the proposed model
can prevent legitimate use by illegitimate users and detect
illegitimate use by authorised users.
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE BREAK-THE-GLASS ACCESS
CONTROL MODEL
The proposed BTG-AC model is an extended version of
Ponder2 in which the BTG concept, obligation policy and
prevention and detection mechanism are applied together. The
interface for all the users such as doctors, nurses and other
member of staff is developed in Java based on managed
objects in Ponder2. The Java class file is loaded dynamically
into SMC. The PEP and PDP are already implemented for
the proposed BTG-AC model but the policies definition and
expression of authorisation, BTG and obligation policy can
vary depend on the requirements of application. The definition
and expression of these three policies for medical data in
Ponder2 is presented as follow.
A. Authorisation Policy
The terms of the authorisation policy can be changed based
on the requirements of the application. In the BTG-AC model,
the predefined authorisation policies will be slightly different
based on the privileges and roles of the users. An example
policy is explained as below:
Def: Permit-Policy
subject A User
role Doctor or Nurse
action Read
target Normal Medical Record
The above authorisation policy defines that a user -a doctor
or a nurse- has a right to perform an action called ’read’ on a
normal medical record. This means that the subject can only
access the targeted object, when he meets the criteria of the
authorisation policy unless the BTG state variable is TRUE to
make a positive decision for access in an emergency situation.
Otherwise, the user request will be denied.
B. Break-The-Glass (BTG) Policy
A BTG policy provides a flexibility on decision making
process regarding access for the emergency or urgent data ac-
cess. Thus, the BTG policy allows a user access to confidential
data even if he does not have the access right. We assumed that
the BTG policy is already defined in advance for these kinds
of situations to perform BTG action at the targeted object. If
there is no BTG policy for that object, the user request will not





target Confidential Medical Record
do Call Obligation Policy
The above BTG policy defines that a user - a nurse -
can perform the BTG action to the targeted object but the
obligation policy will be activated when the access is given to
that user.
C. Obligation Policy
An obligation policy is used along with the authorisation
and BTG policies to prevent unauthorised access and to
detect security violations. The example of obligation policy
is explained as follows:
Def: Audit-Log
on auditrecord
if BTG action is performed
do write.audit < subject, Time, Target, User Role >
The above obligation policy defines that it will be activated
when the ”glass is broken” for urgent and emergency data
access. Thereafter, the users’ information such as subject,
targeted object and user role is stored as comma separated
value (csv) in an audit log for further security purposes.
From the above discussion, it can be seen how the proposed
BTG-AC was developed and how the policies for authorisation,
BTG and obligation can be defined in Ponder2 for medical data
in WSNs. The audit log is kept as comma separate value (csv)
extension in the BTG-AC model. The next section will explain
how the BTG-AC was evaluated based on a medical scenario
that was also developed under Ponder2 package.
V. EVALUATION OF BREAK-THE-GLASS ACCESS
CONTROL MODEL
In this section, a medical scenario is explained. It was
developed under the Ponder2 package to evaluate the BTG-AC
model for BSNs and WMSNs. We assumed that a SMC [9]
is represented as the wearable sensor node. In the example
scenario, each patient had his own BSN, which consisted
of several sensors. The sensor nodes sense and collect
information such as glucose level, temperature, heart rate, etc.
We assumed that collected data were stored as the medical
record in BSN. Users such as doctors and nurses were trying
to access the medical record of the patients via mobile,
personal digital assistant or personal computer. For example,
sensors are able to interact with each other via IEEE 802.15.4
wireless links and interactions with other mobile phone and
personal digital assistant from users via Wifi or Bluetooth.
Each SMC had managed its own policy. These policies were
specified and could be performed by each SMC.
In a medical scenario, there are two different types of
data for each patient: normal medical records (ob2) and
confidential medical records (ob1). The access policies for
users’ access to these medical records will be different based
on the access privileges and roles of the users. Also different
security levels are required in these medical records. This
means that the tight policies might be used for confidential
medical records to provide data privacy. Nevertheless, the
access to even confidential data can be essential in some
circumstances. For example, the doctor should be able to
access the confidential medical record of a patient when the
nurse cannot but the decision can be changed to a positive
decision if the nurse performs the BTG actions.
Subject Role Operation Object BTG Obligations
Doctor r1 read ob1 - oblg [Write to Audit]
Doctor r2 read ob2 - -
Nurse r3 read ob1 BTG -
Nurse r3 OBTG(read) ob1 - oblg [Notify Manager;
Write to Audit; Trigger
the alarm]
Nurse r4 read ob2 - oblg [Write to Audit]
Staff r5 read ob2 BTG -
Staff r5 OBTG(read) ob2 - oblg [Notify Manager;
Write to Audit; Trigger
the alarm]
TABLE I. EXAMPLE OF BTG-RBAC POLICY
Table 1 shows how the designed of BTG-AC model
is developed for medical data in WSNs with predefined
authorisation, BTG and obligation policies. In this table, the
role (r1) is related to a doctor. The doctor is allowed to
access the confidential medical record (ob1) of a patient but
an obligation such as ”Write to Audit” will be taken as an
action when the decision has been made. This means that
the management teams can check the audit log to detect
security breaches of doctor. The role (r2) allows access of the
doctor to the normal medical record (ob2) without obligation.
This means that the stored data at the object (ob2) is not as
sensitive as object (ob1). The roles and policies for other users
such as nurses and other members of staff will be predefined
differently.
In role (r3), the nurse is not permitted to access the
confidential data (ob1) unless he performs the BTG action in
that object for emergency data access but some obligations will
be activated when ”the glass is broken”. This means that an
extra BTG role is needed for the nurse. The role (r4) allows
the nurse to access the normal medical data (ob2) but still
one obligation action is triggered. The role (r3) and (r5) have
a similar property. There is no way for other members of
staff in the hospital to gain access to the confidential medical
record (ob1). There is a way for them to access the normal
medical record (ob2) but they have to ”break the glass”. The
administrator or manager can easily check the audit log to
detect illegitimate use from authorised users and to prevent
legitimate use from unauthorised users.
A. Evaluation Framework Based on Example Scenario
We evaluate the BTG-AC model based on an example
scenario that was developed under Ponder2 package. In this
section, user interface, BTG interface, audit log interface for
prevention and detection module and how the access decision
was made based on different access policies are presented with
following screen shots.
Fig. 3. User Interface for A Doctor
1) User Interface: To evaluated the BTG-AC model for
medical data in WSNs, we developed the users’ interfaces
under Ponder2 package. Based on Figure 3, a doctor (Aung)
tries to access the normal medical data of Alice. His access
has been granted without any obligation. When he requests
access to the confidential data, his requested information will
be stored as an audit log to detect security breaches.
Fig. 4. User Interface for A Nurse
Different access policies are applied to a nurse. Figure 4
shows the interface of a nurse (Htoo). Based on Figure 4, the
nurse can access the normal medical record of Alice but one
obligation action is triggered and activated when the access is
given. The nurse does not have access right regarding access
to the confidential medical data unless the BTG policy is used
to make an authorisation decision as in urgent and emergency
circumstances. At the same time, obligations are triggered and
activated. The management teams can check the audit log to
prevent and detect security violations.
2) BTG Interface: We developed these simple interfaces for
the BTG action. When a nurse wants to perform a BTG action
to access patients’ confidential data, the BTG interface will
appear. The user’s attempt to gain access will be notified to the
user and his/her management team and necessary actions will
be taken for security. The confirmation message will appear
twice before the access is given to the nurse. The interfaces
for BTG action are shown in Figure 5.
Fig. 5. Interfaces for BTG
3) Audit Log Interface: We developed the audit framework
based on managed objects in Ponder2 package. The interface
of an audit log can be seen in Figure 6. This Figure shows what
kind of information and data are stored in the audit log. The
first audit log shows that the nurse accessed the normal medical
record of Alice. For the second log, the same nurse requested
access to the confidential medical record by performing the
BTG action and his or her access was granted. A doctor, who
accessed a confidential medical record, was granted access as
can be seen in the audit log of that patient. All the access
requests to the medical records are recorded in which everyday
is determine by the user’ role. Based on the audit log, the
management teams can check which users performed the BTG
action and who among these will be granted access to the
confidential medical records.
Fig. 6. Interface for Audit Log
B. Summary
Based on the evaluation results with a medical scenario,
the BTG-RBAC model proposed by Ferreira et al [1] can be
applied for medical data in WSNs after the framework and
several changes within the access control engine are made. The
BTG-AC model provides flexibility of decision making pro-
cesses regarding access to medical records. The three policies
such as authorisation, BTG and obligation cooperate with each
other to make decisions about data access in the emergency
situations. Based on the overall outcomes, the BTG-AC model
can be applied in BSN and WSNs.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The overall contributions of this paper are the design and
development of BTG-AC model for medical data in WSNs.
The concepts of BTG, prevention and detection mechanism,
and obligation provide more flexible access than other current
access control models in WSNs. The BTG-AC model has been
developed under Ponder2 package. All the modules - access
control module and prevention and detection module - have
been found to cooperate together to make an access decision
and recorded a users’ accountability to illegitimate data usage
from authorised users as well as excluding illegitimate users
for data access. One possible weakness of BTG-AC is that
the human decision is needed to predefine BTG policy for
each object. We are considered to redesign the BTG-AC model
based on that weakness as future work. In addition, we will
plan to develop the BTG-AC model within the actual sensor
nodes for medical applications in WSNs.
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